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HUTCHCRAFT'S EXECUTOR v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD.
It is not essential, to make out a case of injury through external, violent,
and accidental means, that the person injuring the insured did not mean to
do so.
Where an accident insurance policy is expressed in general terms and spe-
cified things are excepted from the operation of the general terms, the latter
are to be construed as covering all things coming within their scope, except
those expressly excepted.
An exception, in an accident insurance policy, of intentional injuries
inflicted by the insured or any other person, includes death by assassination
for purposes of robbery, and no recovery can be had on the policy.
APPEAL from Bourbon Circuit Court.
William Lindsay and Russell Mann, for appellant.
James S. Pirtle, for appellee.
BENNETT, J. May 29, 1888. During the time that appel-
lant's testator held two tickets of insurance in the appellee's
company, insuring his life in the sum of $3000 each against
death "through external, violent, and accidental means," he
was waylaid and assassinated for the purpose of robbery.
The appellee interposed two defences to the appellant's action
to recover these sums: First, that the appellant's testator
having been killed by intentional "means," his death was
not accidental within the meaning of the terms of the policy,
which insured him against death "through external, violent,
and accidental means ;" second, that the proviso in the policy
expressly exempted the appellee from liability in case the
appellant's testator came to his death through injuries inten-
tionally inflicted by another person. These defences will be
disposed of in their order.
1. In each ticket the appellee covenanted to pay $3000 to
Hutchcraft's representative, if he should be killed "through
external, violent, and accidental means." Accidents are of
two kinds: First, those that befall a person without any
human agency; as the killing of a person by lightning. Here
the elemental properties of lightning and its flash are not
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caused or controlled by human agency; but the fact that the
person was struck by unintentionally placing himself within
its range is as to him an accident. Second, those that are
the result of human agency. The latter are divided as fol-
lows: First, that which happens to a person by his own
agency, as if he is walking or running, and accidentally falls
and hurts himself. Here he falls by reason of his agency in
walking or running, but he did not intend to fall. He did
not foresee that he would fall in time to avoid it. The fall
was therefore accidental. Second, that which befalls a person
by the agency of another person, without the concurrence of
the latter's will; as where one standing on a scaffold unin-
tentionally lets a brick fall from his hand, and it strikes a
person below. Here the dropping of the brick, as it was not
intended by the former, and was unforeseen by the latter, is
in the broadest sense an accident. Third, that which a per-
son intentionally does, whereby another is unintentionally
injured; as where one intentionally' fires a gun in the air,
and accidentally shoots another person. Here the act of firing
the gun was intentional, but the shooting of the person was
unintentional. Therefore, on the part of the person firing the
gun, the shooting of the other would be accidental, though
not in as broad a sense as in the former case, because some
part of his act was intentional; but as to the person shot, it
was by purely accidental means. Fourth, so also, as we
think, if one person intentionally injures another, which was
not the result of a rencontre or the misconduct of the latter,
but was unforeseen by him, such injury as to the latter, al-
though intentionally inflicted by the former, would be acci-
dental. When the injury is not the result of the misconduct
or the participation of the injured party, but is unforeseen, it
is as to him accidental, although inflicted intentionally by the
other party. It is conceded that in the three instances first
named the injury would be by accidental means. Nor doubt-
less will it be denied that, if a person were to maliciously fire
his gun into a crowd of persons for the purpose of general
mischief, or were to maliciously wreck a train of cars for the
purpose of injuring whomever may be aboard, whereby one
or more persons were shot or mashed, the casualty befalling
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these persons, so far as they were concerned, would fall within
the term of accidental means. In other words, we do not
regard it as essential, in order to make out a case of injury by
accidental means, so far as the injured party is concerned,
that the party injuring him should r.ot have meant to do so;
for, if the injured party had no agency in bringing the injury
on himself, and to him it was unforeseen-a casualty-it
seems clear that the fact that the deed was wilfully directed
against him would not militate against the proposition that
as to him the injury was brought on by "accidental means."
2. That part of the proviso that is germane to the second
ground of defence is as follows: "And no claim shall be
made under this ticket when the death or injury may have
been caused by duelling, fighting, wrestling, lifting, or over-
exertion, or by suicide (felonious or otherwise, sane or insane),
or by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured, or any other
person." The fact that the insured engaged in a duel or
fight, though forced upon him; the fact that he engaged
in a wrestling match, however innocent; the fact that he
engaged in lifting, though never so cautious; the fact that he
over-exerted himself, though never so innocent of an intention
of doing so-whereby he received injuries-are expressly ex-
cluded from the operation of the policy. Also the fact that
the insured commits suicide, although insane, therefore in a
legal sense accidental, excludes him from the benefit of the
policy. The remaining clause stipulates for a further ex-
emption of the appellee's liability in the event that inten-
tional injuries are inflicted upon the insured by himself or
any other person. It is contended by the appellant that the
meaning of this clause is, that, "if the insured intentionally
inflicted injuries upon himself, or if any other person inten-
tionally inflicted injuries upon him, with his consent, or at
his instance, then the appellee shall not be liable." A mo-
ment's reflection will show that the clause will not admit of
this construction. The clause, when placed in juxtaposition
with its antecedents, reads as follows: 'N Xo claim shall be
made under this ticket when the death or injury may have
been caused by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or
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any other person." The sentence, though awkwardly ex-
pressed, is complete, and clearly expresses the idea that, if the
insured intentionally kills or injures himself by the infliction
of bodily wounds, he thereby breaks the condition of the
policy; or that, if he is intentionally killed or injured by any
other person, by the infliction of bodily wounds, the condi-
tion of the policy is thereby broken. Therefore to add the
words, " with his consent or at his instance," would have the
effect of torturing the meaning of the language used beyond
its legitimate import. By the terms of the contract the com-
pany undertakes to indemnify against death or injury effected
"through external, violent, and accidental means." By virtue
of this undertaking the company would be liable, if the death
or injury should be effected by any external and violent
means whatever, that was as to the insured accidental, except
in so far as the company by its proviso limited its liability; for
it is a well-known rule of construction, that, where the under-
taking of a party is. expressed in general terms, as in this
caset and specified things, as in this case, are excepted from
the operation of the general terms, such terms are to be con-
strued as covering all things coming within their scope, ex-
cept those that are expressly excluded. As, therefore, the
assassination of Hutch raft was as to him an unforeseen event
-a casualty-his taking off was through external, violent
and accidental means. But we also think the clause of the
proviso that excludes the appellee's liability, in case death or
injury is intentionally inflicted by any other person, applies
to this case. We think, however, that said clause was in-
tended to apply to such injuries by other persons as are
intentionally directed against the insured, and not to such
injuries as the insured may receive at the hands of the third
persons who are attempting to do mischief generally, or who
are attempting to injure any particular individual other than
the assured, or class of individuals, or any kind of property;
for in such cases it cannot be said that -the injury was inten-
tionally aimed directly and individually at the insured.
The judgment of the Circuit Court, overruling the de-
murrer of the appellee's answer, is affirmed.
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What are "accidents," within the
meaning of accident policies and
what the effect of provisos or excep-
tions in such. contracts, can best be
ascertained by a brief review of some
of the principal cases upon this sub-
ject, and the chronological order will
answer for this purpose as well as
any.
Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. (1853),
21 Pa. 466. The condition of the
policy was that it should be void if
the insured "shall die by his own
hand in, or in consequence of, a duel."
Death was caused by swallowing
arsenic. It was held, that such a
death was within the condition.
"When the parties have put their
contract in writing, their rights are
fixed by it. One rule of interpreta-
tion is, that we must never attribute
an absurd intent, if a sensible one can
be extracted from the writing. No ab-
surdity could be greater than a stipu-
lation against suicide in a duel. The
words 'die by his own hand' must,
therefore, be disconnected from those
which follow ; standing alone, they
mean any sort of suicide."
Southard v. The Railway Passengers'
Asso. Co. (1868), 34 Conn. 574, U. S.
D. C. The policy insured against
death or injury "by violent and acci-
dental means, within the meaning
of the contracts and conditions an-
nexed." The conditions specified cer-
tain modes of death or injury which
were excluded from the policy. It
was held, that the specified exclusions
did not operate to make the principal
terms more largely inclusive, but that
the death, though violent, must still
fall strictly within the principal terms
and be caused by means that were ac-
cidental as well as violent. The in-
sured was hurt internally by jump-
ing in great haste from a standing
railroad car at a station, and run-
ning a considerable distance, but his
action was not necessary to his safety,
but was voluntarily undertaken to
effect an important object which re-
quired haste. The injury was not
caused by "accidental means within
the meaning of the contract." Per
StHiPL&N, J. "The policy is one of
indemnity against 'bodily injuries
effected through violent and accidental
means within the meaning of this
contract and the annexed conditions.'
Had the terms of the contract stopped
at the words ' violent and accidental
means,' there would be no difficulty
in disposing of the question; for there
was no accident, strictly speaking, in
the means through which the bodily
injury was effected. It would not
help the matter to call the injury
itself-that is, the rupture-an acci-
dent. That was the result, and not
the means through which it was
effected. Both were done by the
claimant voluntarily, in the ordinary
way, with no unforeseen, accidental,
or involuntary movement of the body.
There was no stumbling, or slipping,
or falling. There was nothing acci-
dental in his movements, any more
than there was in his passing down
the steps of his hotel or in walking
on the street, during each of which
he might have had a stroke of apo-
plexy. Thus, in jumping from the
car and running, there was more
violence, or, properly speaking, more
force; but there was no more accident
than in any ordinary movement of the
body. All the accident there was,
was the result of ordinary means,
voluntarily employed, in a not unu-
sual way. The conditions exclude
death, when caused by duelling, fight-
ing, etc. Now, it may be said that
the exclusion of these specified causes,
leaves, by fair implication, death from
all other causes and under all other
circumstances included in the con-
tract. But, in applying the well-
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known rule of construction, reference
must be had to the main body of the
contract and its subject-matter. It is
not a contract of indemnity against
death effected by all means. The
cause of death or injury must be in
all cases 'violent and accidental,'
or the event is without the scope of the
contract. The cases excluded are
only those which belong to the same
class. The insured jumped from the
car with his eyes open, for his own
convenience, and not from any peril-
ous necessity. He encountered no
obstacle in so doing. He alighted on
the ground just as he intended to do.
So, in running. In both cases, he
accomplished just what he intended
to do, in the way intended, and in
the free exercise of his choice."
Brown v. Railway Passengers' Asso.
Co. (1870), 45 Mo. 221. The policy
was issued to an engineer, who was
killed on his own locomotive. It pro-
vided against death "caused by acci-
dent while travelling by public or
private conveyance provided for the
transportation of passengers." It was
held, that the deceased was insured
against all accidents, without regard
to the capacity in which he was acting.
"It is strongly contended that a loco-
motive is not a conveyance for the
transportation of passengers. This
is true if the ticket applies solely and
exclusively to passengers or travel-
lers. But this ticket was designed to
include something more than the or-
dinary risks incurred by a passenger.
The locomotive is a necessary part of
the conveyance. The ticket was a
general' accident, as contra-distin-
guished from a mere passenger's,
ticket. When tlxe ticket was sold, it
was known that the insured was an
engineer."
Welts v. Conn. Hut. Life ins. Co.
(1871), 48 N. Y. 34. By a condition,
the policy was forfeited in case the
insured entered into any military or
naval service without the consent of
the company. It was also provided
that he was not insured against death
from any of the casualties or conse-
quences of war or rebellion; or from
belligerent forces in any place where
he (the insured) might be. The in-
sured was employed in the army in
building bridges, and, while so en-
gaged, was killed by two of a party
of men, not in uniform, who robbed
the men employed upon the bridge.
Held, that the service which was for-
bidden, was only such as would re-
quire the person to do duty as a com-
batant. That the "war or rebellion"
was such as was carried on by the au-
thority of some de facto government.
North Am. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Burroughs (1871), 69 Pa. 43. An ac-
cident policy insured against death
resulting, within twelve months from
its date, in consequence of an acci-
dent. The insured was killed by an
injury produced by a stroke from
the handle of a pitchfork, which
slipped while he was using it in load-
ing hay. It was held, that the policy
included a death from any unexpected
event, happening by chance, and not
occurring according to the usual
course of things.
Shader v. Railwvay Passengers' Asso.
Co. (1876), 66 N. Y. 441. An acci-
dent insurance policy contained a
proviso that no claim should be made
thereunder, "where the death or in-
jury may have happened while the
insured was, or in consequence of his
having been, under the influence of
intoxicating drink." The insured
was killed by a pistol shot while
dining with a friend. The evidence
tended to show that he was at the
time under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor, of which he had been
drinking freely. The trial Judge
charged as follows: "The question is
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not simply whether he was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor at the
time, but whether the injury occurred
in consequence of that; whether the
injury was the natural and probable
result of his being in that condition.
The jury must see the connecting
link between the injury and the con-
dition he was in." This was hed an
error. "The first inquiry," say the
Court, "which presents itself, is the
oonstruction to be placed upon the
proviso. An exact and accurate in-
terpretation of the language manifestly
conveys the idea, that it was intended
to comprehend all: cases where injury
or death might happen while the in-
sured was under the influence of in-
toxicating drink, as well as such as
might occur by the use thereof. As
to the first class of cases stated in
the proviso, the words imply that it
is not required that the use of intoxi-
cating liquors should be the moving
cause in producing the injury or
death, and it is quite sufficient to
avoid a liability, that the person was
under the influence of such stimu-
lants, without regard to the effect
which might result from such condi-
tion. The limitation in the policy
relates to the condition of the insured,
not to the cause which might produce
death. And here lies the distinction
which is to be drawn in its construc-
tion, for, by any other or different in-
terpretation, the words used would
not only be unnecessary, but meaning-
less and without point. As the policy
was rendered void if the assured was
injured or killed while under the
influence of intoxicating drinks, it
was not essential, to work a forfeiture,
that injury or death should occur in
consequence of the use of the same.
As to the second class of cases, the
policy was designed to provide for the
possible contingency which might
arise after the influence of intoxi-
eating liquors had ceased to operate
directly, and the subsequent effects
produced thereby, in ,consequence of
the previous use thereof. The inten-
tion evidently was to limit the liability
of the company by the contract with
the axsured, and not to incur any re-
sponsibility, when the injury occurred
while the assured was directly under
the influence of, or where the result
was remotely produced by, intoxi-
cating drink. Accidental policies are
issued principally to travellers, or per-
sons exposed to unusual perils and
dangers, and, the risks in such cases
being extremely hazardous, it is by
no means unreasonable that the in-
surer should require that the assured
should be under no exciting influence,
which may affect his self-possession or
judgment, or seriously interfere with
the free, full, and deliberate exercise
of his faculties in protecting himself
from accident or harm."
Bayliss v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1877),
U. S. C. Ct. E. Dist. of N. Y. A
policy against accidental death pro-
vided that it did not cover "any
death which may have been caused
solely or in part by medical treatment
for disease." The insured died in con-
sequence of having inadvertently tak-
en an overdose of opium, which had
been prescribed by a physician on ac-
count of sickness. It was held, that
this death was within the exception.
McCarthy v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
(1879), U. S. C. Ct., R. Dist. of Wis.
A policy provided that there should be
no liability, if the insured should sus-
tain bodily injuries effected through
accidental means. The injury was
claimed to have resulted from exercis-
ing with Indian clubs. The jury was
instructed : "If the insured volun-
tarily used clubs for exercise in the
way, and precisely as, he intended to
do, and in the usual way for taking
such exercise, and there did not occur
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any unusual circumstance interrupt-
ing or interfering with such use, or
causing any unforeseen, accidental, or
involuntary movement of the body
while exercising, and in such use the
injury was received, it could not be
said that the injury was effected by
accidental means. But if there did
occur any unforeseen or unexpected
circumstance which interfered with or
obstructed the usual course of such
exercise, and there was thereby pro-
duced an involuntary movement,
strain, or wrenching of the body, by
means of which the alleged injury
was occasioned, then such means was
accidental within the meaning of the
policy."
Bon v. Railway Passengers' Asso. Co.
(1881), 56 Iowa 664. A policy -pro-
vided: "The insurance shall extend
only to bodily injuries, when acci-
dentally 1eceived by the insured while
actually riding on a public convey-
ance provided by common carriers for
the transportation of passengers, and
in compliance with all rules and reg-
ulations of such carriers, and not ne-
glecting to use due diligence for self-
protection." The insured was riding
on a railroad train, and as it ap-
proached a station and was slowing
up, he went on to the platform, and,
while standing there, was thrown
from the train by being jostled by
another passenger on the platform,
who was thrown against the insured
by a sudden jerk of the train. The
rule of the carrier, which was known
to the insured, was that no one should
stand on 'the platform. It was held,
that, under such a state of facts, the
verdict for the company should be
directed.
Penfold v. Uniersal L. Ins. Co.
(1881), 85 N. Y. 317. The policy con-
tained a condition avoiding it in case
the insured should "die by his own
hand or act, voluntary or otherwise."
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It was held, that this did not cover the
case of a death, purely accidental,
caused by poison taken by the insured
by mistake or ignorance, he being at
the time sane. That the act stipu-
lated against was suicide, and the
words "voluntary or otherwise"
precluded one claiming under the
policy, if the death was suicidal,
from setting up insanity.
Pollock v. U. S. Mut. Ace. Asso.
(1883), 102 Pa. 230. An accident
policy provided that it should not ex-
tend to death or injury caused" by the
taking of poison." Held, that an in-
voluntary taking of poison by mis-
take was within the provision.
Burldzard v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
(1883), Id. 262. A policy against ac-
cidental death provided, "this insu-
rance shall not extend to any case
when the death or injury may have
happened in consequence of voluntary
exposure to unnecessary danger, haz-
ard, or perilous adventure; walking
or being on the road-bed or bridge of
any railway are hazards not contem-
plated or covered by this contract,
and no sum will be paid for disability
or loss of life in consequence of such
exposure or while thus exposed."
The insured stepped off a railroad
train, upon which he was travelling,
when it came to a stop on a draw-
bridge at night, fell through a con-
cealed hole in the bridge and was
killed. It was held, that, where the
general terms and scope of a policy gre
such as to cover a loss, conditions in
the policy restricting liability, so ex-
pressed as to be capable of two mean-
ings, should be held to have the
meaning most favorable to the insured.
Also, that this death was accidental,
and was not within the condition as
to "walking, etc.," as the obvious
intent of this provision was to guard,
not against a defective road-bed or
bridge, but against the danger of in-
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jury from trains passingthereon. The
Court say: "The true principle of
sound ethics is to give the contract the
sense in which the person making the
promise believes theotherparty to have
accepted it. A just sense should be
exercised in so interpreting it as to
give due and fair effect to its provis-
ions: 2 Kent, 557. When a party
uses an expression of his liability,
having two meanings, one broader
and the other narrower, and each
equally probable, he cannot, after an
atoeptance by the other contracting
party, set up the narrow construc-
tion : 2 Whart. on Con. § 670. It is now
well recognized as a general rule, that
when a stipulation or exception on a
policy of insurance is capable of two
meanings, the one is to be adopted
which is most favorable to the in-
sured: May on Ins. §§ 172-9; Wood
on Ins. §§ 141-6; Allen v. Ins. Co.
(1881), 85 N. Y. 473; Western Ins.
Co. v. Cropper (1858), 32 Pa. 351. In
case of doubt as to the meaning of a
term emanating from an insurance
company, it is to be construed most
strongly against the company : Fowkes
v. Ins. Co. (1863),3 B. & S. 917; Wil-
son v. Ins. Co. (1856), 4 R. I. 156;
Bartlett v. Ins. Co. (1859), 46 Me.
500; Ins. Co. v. Slauter (1870), 12
Wall. 404. To make him (the in-
sured) guilty of a ' voluntary expo-
sure to danger' he must intentionally
have done some act which reasonable
and ordinary prudence would pro-
nounce dangerous. * ** It is true
he voluntarily left the car; but a
clear distinction exists between a vol-
untary act, and a voluntary exposure
to danger. htiddendanger mayexis!.;
yet the exposure thereto without any
knowledge of the danger does not
constitute a voluntary exposure td it.
The approach to an unknown and un-
expected danger does not make the
acta voluntary exposure thereto. The
result of the act does not neeeesarily
determine the motive which prompted
the action. The act may be volun-
tary ; yet the exposure involuntary.
The danger being unknown, the in-
jury is accidental. The language of
the exception (as to ' walking or be-
ing, etc.') clearly implies two
thoughts: one, that the insuredmust
not be on the road-bed or bridge for
any length of time; the other, that
the prohibition is not to guard against
injury resulting from a defective road-
bed or bridge; but against the danger
of injury from trains passing thereon.
If the design was to apply the lan-
guage tobridges defectively construct-
ed or out of repair, it would not have
been restricted to railway bridges."
Bloom v. Frankdin L. Ins. Co. (1884),
97 Ind. 478. The policy provided that
it should be forfeited in case the as-
sured should die by reason of intem-
perance or while engaged in the known
violation of law. The assured, whilst
intoxicated, engaged in an assault and
battery upon his sister-in-law, and his
brother, while defending his wife,
fractured his skull and killed him.
The Court say: "The answer of the
company averred, 'said B. (the as-
sured), while in a state of intoxica-
tion, assaulted, etc., C., and while
thus engaged in perpetrating said as-
sault, D., the husband, for the pur-
pose of lawfully defending his wife,
struck B. upon the head with a jack-
plane, or some other wooden instru-
ment, thereby fracturing his skull
and causing his death within a few
hours thereafter.' The plaintiff as-
serts that the facts stated do not show
that the assured died from the effects
of intemperance, or that he met his
death while engaged in knowingly
violating the law. It is sufficient to
state such facts as would enable the
Court to conclude, as matter of law,
that there was an assault and battery
HUTCHCRAFT v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.
committed. The facts stated warrant
this conclusion. If the words em-
ployed are taken in their usual signi-
fication, it would seem quite clear that
death in the known violation of any
law, criminal or civil, would make
the policy inoperative. Suppose that
the law prohibits a person from ap-
proaching within a specified distance
of a blast about to be -fired, wouldnot
a known violation of such a law in-
crease the risk, and be within the letter
and spirit of the provision? But it is
not every violation of law which
should absolve the company, even
though the law be a criminal one.
Suppose a man violates the law
against profanity, and is shot while
so doing, should that absolve the com-
pany from liability?
"In our opinion the law is this:
A known violation of a positive law, ei-
ther civil or criminal, avoids the policy,
if the natural and reasonable consequences
of the violation are to increase the risk;
but does not avoid the policy, if the risk
is not increased. Whether the viola-
tion of the law was the proximate
cause of death and was an act in-
creasing the risk, must in general be
determined from the facts of each par-
ticular case. There must, in all cases,
be some causative connection between
the act which constituted the viola-
tion of the law, and the death of the
assured. The act of the insured was,
in this case, the proximate cause of
his death, within the meaning of the
law. A man who makes a violent
assault upon a woman, puts his own
person in danger. The natural result
of such an illegal act as that of the
assured, was to bring his person in
danger, and as death resulted, his
own act was the proximate cause.
While the unlawful act of the assured
must lead, in the natural line of cau-
sation, to his death, in order to work
a forfeiture, it is not necessary that
the act should be the direct cause, nor
that the precise consequences which
actually followed should have been
foreseen. It is enough if the act is
unlawful in itself, and the conse-
quences flowing from it are such as
might have been reasonably expected
to happen, for the ultimate result is
traced back to the original proximate
cause. A man who beats and mal-
treats another's wife may reasonably
expect the husband to defend her,
without being careful to select the
means of defence or nicely weigh the
degree of forcd."
Bois v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(1885), 14 Ins. L. J. 237 (La).
Where the person whose life is in-
sured has occasioned the discharge
of the pistol which killed him, the
burden of proof is on the beneficiary
to show that the discharge was acci-
dental.
Bradley v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co.
(1871), 45 N. Y. 422. The policy
provided that it should be void in
case the insured should die "in the
known violation of any law of the
State he was permitted to visit. It
was held, that the death must clearly
appear to have been the natural and
legitimate consequence of the viola-
tion of the law.
N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haze-
lett (1885), 105 Ind. 212. A provi-
sion in a life insurance policy, that if
the assured, whether sane or insane,
shall die by his own hand, the policy
shall be void, has no application to
a case where death results from an
overdraught of whiskey taken with-
out any intention of destroying life,.
byonewhohad become physically and
mentally weakc by causes beyond his
control.
Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal (1886),
120 U. S. 527. A policy of insurance
against "bodily injuries effected
through external, accidental, and vio-
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lent means," and occasioning death or
complete disability to do business,
provided, that "this insurance shall
not extend to death or disability which
may have blien caused wholly or in
part by bodily infirmities or disease,
or by suicide, or self-inflicted inju-
ries." It was held, that a death by
hanging one's self, while insane, was
covered by the policy; that such
death was not caused by "bodily in-
firmities, or disease, or suicide, or
self-inflicted injuries," but was ef-
fected through "external, accidental,
and violent means."
Sup. Council of 0. of C. F. v. Gar-
rigus (1885), 104 Ind. 133. The re-
lief laws provided that benefits might
be received by a member who was
disabled by "disease or accident."
The beneficiary was injured without
his own fault, but by an intentional
act on the part of another. It was
held, that an injury intentionally
inflicted by another, but without fault
on the part of the injured, was an
accident, within the meaning of the
insurance contract.
Grifn v. West. Mut. Asso. (1886),
20 Neb. 620. The policy contained a
provision that it should be void, if the
insured should die "while violating
any law." The insured with an ac-
complice went to the State treasury,
and, presenting a pistol, demanded
money. The treasurer handed over
the money to them, and they started
away with it and had nearly reached
the outer door of the building, when
they were fired upon by a policeman,
and the insured was killed. It was
held, that the policy was not avoided.
"The act of the insured in obtaining
the money was complete and he was
endeavoring to make his escape. He,
therefore, was not killed while rio-
lating the law."
Keels v. Mut. Res. Fund L. Asso.
(1886), 29 Fed. Rep. 198; U. S. C. Ct.
D. So. Car. A condition in a life
insurance policy that it shall be
void if the insured shall die by sui-
cide, whether the act be voluntary or
involuntary, does not apply, where
the death is the result of accident or
unintentional self-killing.
Freerran v. Trav.elers' Ins. Co.
(1887), 144 Mass. 573. The policy
insured against bodily injuries
"effected through external, violent,
and accidental means," and con-
tained a proviso that the insurance
should not "extend to any bodily
injuries where death or injury may
have happened in consequence of vio-
lent exposure to unnecessary danger,
hazard, or perilous adventure," and
a further condition that "the party
insured is required to use all due dil-
igence for personal safety and protec-
tion." The insured, who was the
employ6 of a railroad company, was
killed by a train, while upon the
track, where he had been sent to
shovel snow from the crossing. It
was held, that such death was by
"external, violent, and accidental
means ;" that such position was not
"unnecessary exposure to danger ;"
and that the burden was upon the in-
surance company of showing that the
insured had not used "due diligence
for personal safety," etc.
Utter v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1887),
Sup. Ct. Mich. This policy was
against death by "violent, external,
and accidental means," and contained
the following provisions. "No claim
shall be made when the death or in-
jury may have happened in conse-
quence of voluntary exposure to
unnecessary danger, or while the in-
sured was, or in consequence of his
having been, under the influence of
intoxicating drink, or while engaged
in, or in consequence of, any unlaw-
ful act." Also, "This insuranceshall
not be held to extend to disappear.-
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ances; nor to any case of death or in- shot, he-;did. not know the ma he
jury; -unless-the claimant'under policy fired at was Utter, and did not intend
shall establish by direct 'and positive to kill.Utter, it cannot be said that
pioof 'that said death or injury was Utter lost his life 'by the design of
caused by external, violent, and sc.- Berry. Nor can it be held, as'a mat-
cidantal mani, and was not' the re- ter ef law, that Utter was engaged in
suit of 'design, either on -the part an unlawful act, within the meaning
of 'the deoeaid- orof -any other per of" this policy. ,'If, -on being 'refused
son."," The insured was a' deserter admission after rapping on the- door,
from the army, and an officer of the the officer had fired through the door
law iustructed to arrest him shot and and killed Utter, it - could-, not be
killed 'him, upon the insured's ap- claimed that Utter was killed by de-
pearing at 'the door of the house sign, or because, he 'was engaged in
where he was stopping.' The evidence any unlawful act; nor if' Berry fired
'was conflicting-as to whether the officer at the first head he saw poked out of
knew that the man he shot was the the door, -not knowing brcaringwho
person for whomhe'was searching, and it was, can it be held thatothe death
as to whether the shooting was done was by design,,against Utter,'br in
in self-defence, because the officer was consequence of 'any unlawful act on
threatened with a p istol., It was Add, his part." I . I I
that if the officer did not know that The following positions would, seem
the insured was the partyhe fired at, to be established by the foregoing au-
and did'not, intend to 'kill him, it thorities:- I o ,- i I
could not be claimed, as 'a matter of "Accident" has the' same 4meaning
'law, that'the death was the result of .ina policy of insurance that it has in
'design 'within th4 policy;, and that the ordinary affairs of every-day life.
the question whether the insured was ' It is an unforeseen;,fortuitous event;
doing an unlawful act at the time of -'not happening through design or in-
the killing was for-the jury. The tention.
trial Court was' of the opinion "that 'Where a-policy provides that the
the injury was'a pistol-slot wound, death must be effected through," via-
and the firing of the 'pistol was not lent and accidental means," 'violence
accidental, but designed by the firing and accident must concur in produ-
party, and that the policy was not in- Ing the result.
tended to' insure against murder or A proviso that no claim shall be
'wilful killing of any kind, but in- made in' certain specified cases does
-"tended to insure against ordinary not operate, to make the principal
accidental means alone, " and directed 'terms more largely inclusive, but re-
a verdict for the insurance company. stricts them.
The Supreme!Court reversed, holding A- Apecified case, excepted from the
'that the questions involved Were, for general terms of a policy by a proviso,
the jury, and in their opinion say.: i- order to forfeit the pblicy, must be
"The design 'intended by the terms of one wfic'h increases the risk, and not
'this 'policy must be 'the design, that - merely'one'which falls within the let-
'intended 'the actual result 'accom- ,te, or' ltmguage, of the 'contract.
plished, 'and not tho design of the'act 'The e'xpression "mayhave 'hap-
itself, Which' act'resulted in, the kill- ')en'dd," 'in a provisb, does not inclule
"'ing of' ne contrary to' tWe design'of doubtful"ies, whbre it is merely un-
the "act;' If, when' Berry" fired -the" 'certain: whether 'or not the, death
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occurred by reason of the causes
specified. It must still be proved
that the death was effected by some
of the excepted causes.
A proviso may declare that the
policy shall not cover the case of a
death which happened either by a
specified cause or while the insured
was in a specified cndi6ton.
Where it is provided thatthe policy
shall not cover a death 4bich hap-
pens in consequence of, or while the
insured was engaged in, a certain act,
it is not sufficient to prove merely the
act and the death ; there must appear
a connecting link between the act and
the death.
Where the terms of a proviso are
of doubtful, or capable of more than
one, meaning, they are construed most
strongly against the insurance com-
pany.
The intention of the injurer to doa
hurt does not make the injury the
less accidental, so far as the insured
is concerned.
Where a policy provides that it
does not cover a case of death happen-
ing through desin, a particular de-
sign to injure or kill the insured is
meant.
In Hutchcraft's Ex. v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., supra, the Court agree that
the death was accidental, so far as the
insured was concerned; and this view
seems to be supported by the authori-
ties. Was the death within the pro-
viso? Three classes of cases are
excepted from the general terms of the
policy, in the following provision:
"Anil no claim shall be made under
this ticket when the death or injury
may have been caused (1) by duel-
ing, fighting, wrestling, lifting, or
over-exertion, (2) by suicide, felonious
or otherwise, sane or insane; (3) by
intentional injuries inflicted by the
insured or any other person." For
the purposes of this case, the proviso
is asifitread, '* * * when thedeath
may have been caused by intentional
injuries inflicted by the insured or
any other person." The Court say
this clause means, " thatif the insured
intentionally kills or injures himself
by the infliction of bodily wounds, he
thereby breaks the condition of the
policy; or that, if he is intentionally
killed or injured by any other person,
by the infliction of bodily wounds, the
condition of the policy is thereby
broken." The Court refer the adjec-
tive "intentional" to the "death,"
and not to the "injuries." This con-
struction of this clause does not ap-
pear to be correct. If the "death"
was "intentional," it would seem not
to be "accidental," and therefore, it
would be without, and not within, the
policy, which is against accident.
And in that case, of course, there
could be no claim under the policy,
not because of the proviso which ex-
cepted from the general terms certain
kinds of accidental death, but because
the death happened from a risk not
insured against.
The adjective "intentional" in this
clause qualified the injuries, whether
inflicted by the insured or other per-
son, and therefore characterizes the
same kind of act on the part of the
insured or any one else. In the case
of the insured, this cannot be held to
mean ''intentional death," for this
has already been provided for by the
clause against suicide, which covers
all cases of intentional death on his
part. This construction also makes
the whole proviso absurd, for it then
would read "when the death may
have been caused by intentional
death." To hold, however, that the
adjective qualifies the word "inju-
ries" gives. the clause a perfectly
intelligible meaning, and shows that
the policy is intended to provide for
an accepted class of causes of acci-
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dental death, in addition to the classes
in the first and second clauses of the
proviso. For while the "injuries"
inflicted may have been "inten-
tional," the death may still be "acci-
dental," and if, in a given case, the
death was actually caused by these
"intentional injuries," then, although
"accidental," it is not covered by the
policy.
Tile question, therefore, in each
case would be, was the death caused
by the injuries inflicted?
This case seems to have come be-
fore the Court on a demurrer to the
answer filed bythe insurance company,
and the Court of Appeals affirm the
judgment of the lower Court in over-
ruling this demurrer. The Court in
their opinion say: "He (the insured)
was waylaid and assassinated for
the purpose of robbery." This state-
ment would generally be considered
to be a conclusion from a series of
facts stated in the pleadings or proved
in evidence. If the answer simply
sets forth the conclusion which is
stated in the opinion, it would seem
that a mistake in pleading had been
made, and there had been raised a
question of law for the Court, when
there should have been a question of
fact for the jury; with, perhaps,




In the following recent cases, condi-
tions in accident and life insurance
policies, similar to those considered
above, have been construed by the
Courts :
Bacon v. U. S. Mut. Accident Asso.
(1887), 44 Hun (N. Y.), 599. Death
resulted from a malignant pustule,
which was caused by poison commu-
nicated from the skins of diseased
animals ; the policy insured against
death "by external, violent, and ac-
cidental means," and excepted death
by taking poison. Held, that the in-
sured was liable.
Pad v. Travelers' Lhs. Co. (1887),
45 Ie. 313. Death was caused by the
accidental inhaling of escaping illu-
minating gas by the insured, while
asleep in his bed-room at a hotel ;
the policy covered death "through
external, violent, and accidental
means," but excepted bodilyinjuries,
"of which there shall be no external
and visible sign upon the body," and
"death by the taking of poison, con-
tact with poisonous substances, or in-
haling of gas, or by any surgical
operation, or medical treatment."
Held, that the death was within the
policy, and the insurer was liable.
The words "inhaling of gas," in the
exception, referred only to the use of
gas in dentistry, surgery, or other
similar manner.
U. S. M t. Accident Asso. v. New-
man, S. Ct. App. Va., Dec. 13, 1887.
Death was caused in the same man-
ner as in the last cited case ; the
policy covered the same risks, but
excepted death caused "by taking of
poison, or by contact with poisonous
substances." Held, the death of the
insured was within the policy.
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey
(1888), 127U. S. 661. Theinsuredwas
found dead from a pistol-shot through
the heart. There was no evidence to
show whether his death occurred by his
own act, or by that of another person;
the policy insured against death
"through external, violent, and ac-
cidental means," but excepted death
by "suicide, felonious or otherwise,
sane or insane," or "intentional inju-
ries inflicted by the insured or any
other person." Held, that the bur-
den of proof was upon the claimant
to show that death was caused by ex-
ternal violence and accidental means.
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McGlinchey v. Adity 4. Casualty Co.
(1888), S. Jud. Ct. Me., 27 AMaRCAN
LAW REGISTER, 607, 663. Death
caused by the exertion of controlling
a runaway horse, or by fright occa-
sioned to the driver by the peril of
his situation, is covered by an acci-
dent insurance policy. A clause ex-
cepting bodily injuries, of which there
is no external and visible sign upon
the body, does not extend to injuries,
which result in death.
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Jones (1888),
S. Ct. Ga., Aug. 28, 1888. The in-
sured fell and was injured while at-
tempting, on a dark and rainy night,
and with two packages in his hands,
to cross a railroad trestle, which he
knew to be dangerous, although other
ways to his home were open to him.
Held, that the injury was caused by
"voluntary exposure to unnecessary
danger " thus falling within the ex-
ception in the policy.
National Benefit Asso. v. Grawnan
(1886), 107 Ind. 288. A policy limit-
ing the risk to death "proximately
caused by physical injuries, of which
there shall be some visible external
sign," covers death from apoplexy,
resulting from an injury caused by
an accidental fall.
Tennantv. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1887),
U. S. Circ. Ct. N. D. Cal., 31 Fed.
Rep. 322. The insured, who was sub-
ject to epileptic fits, was found dead
in a bath. The testimony showed
that the entrance into the bath of one
in his physical condition would be
likely to result in an epileptic attack.
Held, that the death was not occa-
sioned "by external, violent, and ac-
cidental means."
In the English case of Winspear v.
Accident ins. Co., Lim. (1880), L. R.
6 Q. B. D. 42, an accident insurance
policy, which provided that it should
not extend "to any injury caused by
or arising from natural disease or
weakness, or exhaustion consequent
upon disease," was held to cover a case
where the insured, whilst fording a
stream, was seized with an epileptic
fit, fell and was drowned.
In Lawrence v. Accidental Ins. Co.,
Lim. (1881), 7 Id. 216, where the pol-
icy expressly excepted "death aris-
ing from fits, or other disease, whether
causing such death directly or jointly
with an accidental injury," the in-
sured, while on the platform of a
railway station, was seized with an
epileptic fit, fell upon the track be-
fore a moving engine, and was run
over and killed. Held, that the death
was within the policy.
Kerr v. Minnesota Mlut. Ben. Asso.
(1888), S. Ct. Minn., 27 AMERICAN
LAw REGISTER, 803. Suicide to avoid
arrest and trial for a crime committed
by the insured, does not fall within
a provision of a policy, excepting
death "in consequence of the viola-
tion of any criminal law."
Day-row v. Family Fund Soc. (1886),
42 Hun (N. Y.), 245, and Freeman v.
Nat. Benefit Soc., Id. 252. Suicide by
insured does not avoid a policy, pro-
viding that it shall be void, if the in-
sured shall die "in violation of, or at-
tempt to violate, any criminal law."
Scarth v. Security Mut. Life Soc.
(1888), S. Ct. Iowa, 27 AMERICAN LAw
REGISTER, 803. Suicide, committed
while the insured is temporarily in-
sane and in no manner conscious or
responsible, avoids a policy providing
that it shall become void, if the in-
sured " sh all commit suicide, felonious
or otherwise, sane or insane."
To the same effect is Streeter v. West.
Un. Mut. Life Soc., S. Ct. Mich., Feb.
15, 1887.
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